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In the Supreme· Court 
of the State of IJta.h_ 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, . 
v. Case No. 7762 
ROSE DUCINNIE DAVIE, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF AND RESPONDENT 
·STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The statement of facts· as stated in the appellant's brief 
is acceptable to the ·state. The statute under which this con.;. 
viction was had is 103-51-21, Utah Code Annotated 1943, 
insofar as it is pertinent to this appeal and provides: 
It shall be unlawful for any person: 
( 1) To keep a house of ill fame resorted to for the 
purpose of prostitution or lewdness, or to willfully 
reside in such house, or to resort thereto for lewdness; 
or, 
(2) * • * 
2, 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS 
I. STATE'S WITNESSES SEQUIRA, HICKS, MAN-
DONADO, MUIR AND LYMAN WERE NOT ACCOM-
PLICES. 
II. EVEN ASSUMING WITNESSES SEQUIRA, HICKS, 
MANDONADO, MUIR AND LYMAN WERE ACCOM-
PLICES, THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ERR IN FAIL .. 
lNG TO SO INSTRUCT THE JURY. 
III. THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ERR IN ADMIT-
TING THE RECORDS ~F THE TELEPHONE.COMPANY,. 
THE POWER COMPANY AND THE INSURANCa 
I 
AGENT. 
POINT I 
STATE'S WITNESSES SEQUIRA, HICKS, MANDON· 
ADO, MUIR AND LYMAN. WERE NOT ACCOMPLICES. 
The defendant was charged with the crime of keeping a 
house of ill fame resorted to for the purpose of prostitution and 
lewdness. We do not have a statutory definition of accom-
plices. Section 10~~-1 ... 43, Utah Code Annotated 1943, defines 
who are principals. In the case of State v. Bowman, 92 Utah 
540, 70 P. 2d 458, this court stated that the word "accomplice" 
has been construed to refer to one who is or could be charged 
.. as a principal with the defendant on trial. 
Defendant acknowledges that the witnesses could not 
be charged with the crime of keeping a house of prostitution, 1 1 
but asserts, apparently, that defendant and the· witnesses could 
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have been charged under that part of the; statute making it an 
offense to ttresort thereto for lewdness." Defendant, however, 
was not charged with resorting, and even if the ~itriesses could 
have been charged under the separate offense of r~sorting 
"thereto for lewdness" that would not make them accomplices 
in this case. 
California has a statute defining· principals which. is sub~ 
stantially similar to ours. 
Section 11.11 of the Penal Code of California which 
requires that testimony of an accomplice be corroborated before 
a conviction can be had was amended in 1915 to define an 
accomplice as follows: 
An accomplice is hereby defined as one who is liable 
to prosecution for the identical offense charged against 
defendant on trial in the cause in which the testimony 
of the accomplice is given. 
This amendment came about as a result of the decision of 
People v. Coffey, 161 Cal. 433, 119 P. 901, 39 L.R.A. (N.S.) 
704, which is cited by defendant. Since the time of the amend-
ment the courts of California have given a much stricter arid 
restrictive definition of an accomplice. The case of People v. 
Clapp, 151 P. 2d 237 (1944), 24 Cal. 2d 75~, is an illustration. 
This was a case where the defendant had_ performed an abor-
tion upon one of the witnesses, and two ()ther witnesses hacl 
watched the operation. It was aserted on appeal that the two 
witnesses who were present during the operation were ac-
complices, and, therefore, their testimony neede~ to be cor-
roborated as required by Section 11.11 of the Penal Code. 
The court stated: 
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*- * .* · Itjs necessary to determine whether sections 
31 and, 971 of the Penal- Code or other provisions of 
the. criminal law subject the witness to . prosecution 
undet the provisions that the defendant is .accused ·of 
violating, or whether the acts of the witness partici-
pating in the transaction constitute a sep~rate and dis-
. tinct offense~ If cf statutory provision so ·defines a crime 
that the participation of two or more persons is neces-
sary for. its'. commission, . but . ·.prescribes punishment 
for the acts of certain participants only, and another 
statutory provision prescribes punishment for the acts 
of participat;1ts not subject to the first provision, it is 
clear that the latter are criminally liable only under 
the specific prov:ision relating to their participation in 
the criminal_ transaction. The specific provision making 
the acts of· participation in the transaction. a separate 
offense sup~rcedes the general provision in section 31 
of the Penal Code that such acts subject the participant 
in. t~e crime of the accused to prosecution for its· com-
mtsston. 
The reasoning of this case was extended in the case of People 
v. Grayson, 189 P. 2d 285, s·Cal. App. 2d 516 (1948). The 
appellant was convicted of receiving and holding a wager on 
a horse race.· On· appeal he complained that a witness, one· 
Pease, who placed .··a bet 'vith the defendant, was an accom-
plice. In this case there were not two separate statutes cover-
ing the offenses, but section 3 7 a of the Penal Code of Cali-
fornia had s·everat··subdivisions. Subdivision 3 made it illegal 
fot a person to receive bets. Subdivision . 6 of the section made 
it illegal for a person to offer or place a· bet. The court reasoned: 
* * * -so, here, since the act of placing ~ bet, with-
out which, of course, the bet could not be received by 
another, was pu~ishable as a separate . offense under 
subdivision·· 6, · and .. was not specifically under sub-
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division 3, it \vas not punishable- ·under· section 31, 
and Pease was not an accomplice of appellant who re-
ceived the bet. The testimony of Pease was sufficient, 
without corroboration, to prove the offense charged in 
count one. 
The defendant in the present case is ~barged with keep-
ing.a house of ill fame. Section 103-51-21,. Utah Code Anno-
tated 1943, has several subdivisions. Within subdivision 1 
there are several clauses, to-wit: 
It shall be unlawful for any person: 
( 1) To keep a house of ill fam.e resorted ~o for the 
purpose of prostitution or lewdness, o~ • to willfully re- -
side in such house, or to resort thereto for le~dness; 
It is the contention of the State that each ··of these clauses is 
a separate and distinct offense just as though they were set 
out in separate subdivisions or separate sections. Consequently, 
if the above-mentioned witnesses were guilty of a crime it 
\vas a separate and distinct offense-that of r~sortiqg to a house 
of ill fame for lewdness. 
It has been held in Iowa that a woman-engaged i~ pros-
titution in a house of ill fame is not an · accomplice of the 
person charged with the management of the house.· This was 
based upon the theory that ther~ was no affirmative partici-
pation in the actual management. The Iowa statute defining 
principal is similar. to ours. In State. v. Anderson, 38 :NW 662, 
the defendant ~as convicted of . keeping 3: house _of ill -fame. 
Four women who stayed in the ·house testified to numerous 
acts of prostitution in t~e place and under the supervision of 
the defendant who received part of the remuner~tio_n paid to 
the women by the men patro~izing the_ ho~se. Two of these 
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women did not assist 1n its management. The other two 
did_-such wo~k as. night clerking, serving drinks and hustling. 
The lower court failed to instruct. that the two who did not 
. . . 
ha~e any control of .the manageJ?ent of the house were accom~ 
plices. The court did instruct tht~t the other two w~re accom~ 
plices and that the statute of Iowa required corroboration. The 
appellate court said: 
'' * * * Two of these witnesses were intimates of 
the place but did · not assist in its management, there-
fore they were not to be deemed accomplices. Ho\V-
ever, there is evidence from which the jury could find 
two other \Vitnesses were accomplices. (Page 665). 
See also People v. \Vebb, 25 N.Y.S. 2d 554; reversed on 
other grounds, 26 N.Y.S. 2d ~·86; People v. Swift, 261 App. 
Div. 808, 23 N.Y.S. 1022; Jackson v. United States, D. C. 
App.- ( 1919), 48 App. D. C. 269; State v. Chauvet 1900, 111 
Iowa 687, 83 N.W. 717, 51 L.R.A. 630, 82 Am. St. Rep. 359; 
Stone v. State (1919), 47 Tex. C. Cr. 575, 85 S.W. 808; 
People v. Richardson ( 1917), 22 N.Y. 103, 118 N.E. 514; 
16 C.J. 1388, page 681. It should be noted that New York, 
Iov1a and California have statutes which are substantially 
similar to the State~of Utah's defining principal and requiring 
corroboration of accomplices' testimony. 
It is not contended that these four v1itnesses in the present 
case ·had any active management in the keeping of the house 
of ill fame which the defendant is ·accused of operating. It 
is, therefore, .submitted that they were not accomplices any 
more than 'vas the prostitute in the Iowa case. 
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POINT II 
EVEN ASSUMING WITNESSES SEQUIRA, HICKS, 
MANDONADO, MUIR AND LYMAN WERE ACCOM-
PLICES, THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ERR IN FAIL-
ING TO SO INSTRUCT THE JURY. 
This court in the case of State v. Simpson~ 236 P. 2d 
1077, decided October 26, 1951, squarely met the ques-
tion of whether the refusal of a trial judge to instruct the 
jury regarding the testimony of accomplices and the need 
for corroboration thereof was in error. 
As to the third point, while it is perhaps a better 
practice for the trial court to give a cautionary instruc-
tion regarding the testimony of an accomplice, it is 
generally held that this is a matter which lies within 
the discretion of the trial judge, and it· is not reversible 
error to fail to give such an instruction. People v. Ruiz, 
144 Cal. 251, 77 P. 907; Commonwealth v. Beal, 314 
Mass. 210, 50 N.E. 2d 14; State v. Gaddis, 131 N.J.L. 
44, 34 A.2d 735; Gordon v. State, 188 Miss. 708, 196 
So. 507; U. S. v. Block, 2 Cir., 88 P.2d 618; and People 
v. Nathanson, 389 Ill. 311, 59 N.E. 2d 677. p. 1083. 
The instructions usually given in criminal cases as to 
the weight of testimony and the credibility of witnesses was 
given in this case. Instruction No. 13 is particularly in point. 
You are the sole judges of all questions of fact, of 
the weight of the evidence and the credibility of the . 
witnesses. In weighing the testimony you may con-
sider the bias, if any is shown, of any witness to testi-
fy for or against any party, his interest, if any, in the 
· result of the trial, his appearance on the witness stand, 
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and any probable· motive which he may -have to tell 
that \Vhich is not true; you may COnsider the reason-
ableneSS of the witnesses' statements, their apparent 
··frankness ~nd candor, <?r the want of it, their oppor-
tunity to kn~ow and understand, and their capacity to 
ren1ember, and from all the facts- and. circumstances-
given in evicience dete,.-mine. what weight ought to pe 
given to t~~ testimony of ariy witnes<s. 
There vvas ample corroborative evidence coming from 
police officers Garside (R. 32-61) (R. 133, 136), Bennett 
'(R. 104-136), Wilson. (R. 127), and Henderson (R. 106), 
and the other witnesses. 
POINT III 
THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ERR IN ADMIT-
TING THE RECORDS OF THE TELEPHONE COMPANY, 
THE POWER COMPANY AND THE INSURANCE 
AGENT. 
The record of the telephone .company was identified by 
the unit manager of the Ogden office. He identified them as 
records of the company which showed telephone listings of 
the users of the se~vice of the company. He stated that they 
were from his office, and that he had access_ to them (R. 82). 
As to the power company's records the person identifying 
those records stated he was an employee of the power com-
pany, that he took the records from the files of . the power 
company. of which he had charge, and that it was his duty to 
keep records of the users of the power company's service (R. 
103-104:). 
10 
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This state has recognized th~ "shop book" rule in several 
cases, a list of which is given in Clayton v. Metropolitan Life 
Ins. Co .. , 96 U. 331, 85 P. 2d 819, 822. In the case of Bohlke 
v. Wright, 93 P. 2d 321, 200 Wash. 3·74 ( 1939), it was urged 
that it was error to allow the admission of the record of a tele-
phone conversation. The divisional manager of the telephone 
company was allowed to identify the record. 
The slip of paper was part of the records of the 
t~lephone company, and as such was entitled to be 
admitted in evidence. Citations omitted.) p. 32=·· 
See also Pinkerton's National Detective Agency v. Rosedale 
Silk Co., 184 Atl. 282, 121 Pa. Supra 496. 
The records of the insurance company were identified by 
Mr. Harold Tribe, who shared business office space with the 
insurance agent, William J. Holmes, who at the time of the 
trial, was out of the state. He testified that they shared offices, 
that they had had occasion to assist each other in various ways 
and were familiar with the records in each other's business. 
He identified an insurance diary which was kept in the files 
at "our office." On cross examination he testified that he had 
an occasion to take and replace the record in the insurance 
company's files, and that the record came from the file tn 
their office (R. 99-102). 
The necessity of verifying the correctnes~ of entries 
by the bookkeeper, clerk or other person who made the 
entries in a book of accounts is obviated or necessarily 
relaxed when such person has died, has become and 
remains at the time of the trial, insane or physically 
unable to attend as a witness, is beyond the jurisdiction 
11 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
of the court or otherwise unavailable as a witness. 
* * * . 20 Am. Jur., Evidence, Section 1070. 
It is submitted that Mr. Tribe had ample opportunity to be 
familiar with the records of the insurance company inasmuch 
as he had a joint office with this insurance company and had 
assisted the agent thereof in various ways. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that the lower court did not 
err in refusing to instruct on accomplices' testimony or in 
admitting into the evidence the records heretofore referred to. 
Respectfully, 
12 
CLINTON D. VERNON, 
Attorney General 
J. RICHARD BELL, 
Assistant Attorney General 
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